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ACSEE: Antagonistic Crowd Simulation Model
with Emotional Contagion and Evolutionary
Game Theory
Chaochao Li, Pei Lv, Dinesh Manocha, Hua Wang, Yafei Li, Bing Zhou, and Mingliang Xu*
Abstract—Antagonistic crowd behaviors are often observed in cases of serious conflict. Antagonistic emotions, which is the typical
psychological state of agents in different roles (i.e. cops, activists, and civilians) in crowd violent scenes, and the way they spread through
contagion in a crowd are important causes of crowd antagonistic behaviors. Moreover, games, which refers to the interaction between
opposing groups adopting different strategies to obtain higher benefits and less casualties, determine the level of crowd violence. We
present an antagonistic crowd simulation model, ACSEE, which is integrated with antagonistic emotional contagion and evolutionary
game theories. Our approach models the antagonistic emotions between agents in different roles using two components: mental emotion
and external emotion. We combine enhanced susceptible-infectious-susceptible (SIS) and game approaches to evaluate the role of
antagonistic emotional contagion in crowd violence. Our evolutionary game theoretic approach incorporates antagonistic emotional
contagion through deterrent force, which is modelled by a mixture of emotional forces and physical forces defeating the opponents.
Antagonistic emotional contagion and evolutionary game theories influence each other to determine antagonistic crowd behaviors. We
evaluate our approach on real-world scenarios consisting of different kinds of agents. We also compare the simulated crowd behaviors
with real-world crowd videos and use our approach to predict the trends of crowd movements in violence incidents. We investigate the
impact of various factors (number of agents, emotion, strategy, etc.) on the outcome of crowd violence. We present results from user
studies suggesting that our model can simulate antagonistic crowd behaviors similar to those seen in real-world scenarios.
Index Terms—Group violence, emotional contagion, evolutionary game theory
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Crowd simulation has received increased attention in
virtual reality, games, urban modeling, and pedestrian dy-
namics. One of the most important tasks in crowd sim-
ulation is to generate realistic crowd behaviors. Physical
methods [1], [2], [3], psychology principles [4], [5], [6], or
approaches from other relatively matured disciplines [7],
[8], [9], [10] are leveraged into the crowd simulation to
improve the similarity between simulation results and real-
world crowd movements. As pointed out in [4], emotion has
a great influence on crowd behavior and it often invokes an
agent to implement either a positive or negative behavioral
response. Thus, the emotion modeling in crowd simulation
is always the main focus in latest research work. How-
ever, the emotional aspect of antagonistic crowd behaviors
among people in different roles is left unexplored [11].
Analyzing the emotions of antagonistic crowd behaviors is
indeed extremely important, as it can help us understand
evolution process of antagonistic crowd behaviors and pre-
dict trends of crowd movements.
In this paper, we mainly deal with the problem of sim-
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ulating antagonistic crowd behaviors. Such behaviors are
associated with acts of violation and destruction and are
typically carried out as a sign of defiance against a central
authority or an indication of conflict between opposing
groups [12]. Our goal is to develop a new crowd simulation
model that can predict trends of crowd movement in these
situations while ignoring the trajectory of a particular indi-
vidual, discuss the conditions of winning and losing sides,
and help to develop measures to quell incidents of crowd
violence. Not only will such a method be useful for training
police officers, but it could also predict the trends of crowd
movements and provide the decision for controlling crowd
violence incidents.
It is difficult to simulate realistic antagonistic crowd be-
haviors because of complex influencing factors. In practice,
such behaviors are closely related to antagonistic emotions
[13], [14], i.e. the emotions between opposed groups, and
evolutionary game theory [5], [12]. In the pursuit of more
realistic antagonistic behaviors in virtual agents, antagonis-
tic emotion simulation should be incorporated into crowd
simulation models [6]. Most prior crowd simulation models
ignore antagonistic emotions and individuals’ antagonistic
behaviors. Fu et al. [15] focus on agents’ emotions for only
one role without involving the antagonistic emotions be-
tween different types of agents. Some empirical methods of
modeling antagonistic behaviors are presented in the form
of riot games [16], game theoretic models [17], and social
networks. These methods are based on statistical spatial-
temporal analysis and role-playing dynamics in crowds and
can generate emergent social phenomena. Other models use
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evolutionary game theory to simulate the behaviors and
interactions between different kinds of agents [12], [18].
Evolutionary game theory has successfully helped explain
many complex and challenging aspects of biological and
social phenomena in recent decades [18]. Inspired by the
idea that more offspring will be produced by more fit biolog-
ical organisms in a given environment, evolutionary game
theory provides us with the methodology to study strategic
interactions among agents in incidents of crowd violence
[19]. There is considerable work on evaluating individuals’
emotions [20], [21]. Panic, for example, destroys an individ-
ual’s normal mental function, transforms the individual into
an irrational state, and can lead to unpredictable abnormal
behaviors. Furthermore, Durupinar et al. [5] point out that
agents’ emotions dominate their decision-making process
in games and other behaviors. However, the relationship
between antagonistic emotion and antagonistic crowd be-
havior has not been fully explored [15]. It is challenging
to accurately model antagonistic emotions among agents
in different roles because the antagonism is complex and
changes constantly and dynamically [22]. Moreover, prior
methods do not consider the effect of antagonistic emotion
on evolutionary game theory despite the fact that emotion
influences an agent’s behavior significantly. For example, Lv
et al. [23] calculate emotions based on political viewpoints of
individuals at political rallies. Their method doesn’t involve
evolutionary game theory or explore the relationship be-
tween evolutionary game theory and antagonistic emotion.
Recent advances in crowd simulation models attempt
to simulate plausible human behavior by introducing psy-
chological phenomena to virtual agents [6]. Inspired by
the psychological theory in [24], which shows the char-
acterization and simulation of emotional contagion, these
psychological phenomena effectively improve the reliability
of simulations. Fu et al. [15] integrate emotional contagion
with individual movement to obtain realistic emotions and
behaviors in a crowd during an emergency. Based on this
method, we propose an enhanced SIS model considering
the benefits of games and test our antagonistic emotional
contagion method among agents in different roles. More-
over, we integrate antagonistic emotional contagion with
evolutionary game theory through deterrent force, which
describes the differences between agents more accurately.
Finally, we determine antagonistic crowd behaviors com-
bining antagonistic emotional contagion and evolutionary
theories.
Our main contributions include:
• We propose a method to simulate emotion contagion
between antagonistic agents in different roles, which
is determined by combing the enhanced SIS and
game approaches.
• We propose a kind of deterrent force, which is mod-
elled by a mixture of emotional forces and physical
forces defeating the opponents, and it helps individ-
uals make reasonable decisions in the games.
• We integrate antagonistic emotions into an evolu-
tionary game theoretic method through deterrent
force to model antagonistic crowd behaviors more
realistically.
Our model can generate simulation results that are clos-
est to the real-world scenarios in the overall trends of crowd
movements. We have implemented our model and tested it
on several outdoor scenarios with varying ratios of different
types of roles. Our simulation results are compared with
the real-world videos and we evaluate the benefits of our
model by performing user studies. The results indicate that
the behaviors of agents generated by our model are closer to
real-world scenes in the overall trend of crowd movements
than those seen in other methods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review
related work in Section 2. We give an overview of our
method in Section 3. We introduce our model in Section
4 and show it can be used to generate antagonistic crowd
behaviors. We describe the implementation and highlight
its performance on complex scenarios in Section 5. We also
present results from our preliminary user studies in Section
5.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a brief overview of prior works in
emotional contagion, evolutionary game theory, and agent-
based crowd simulation.
2.1 Emotional contagion
Emotion is a psychological parameter and has a significant
influence on individuals in a crowd [5], [25], [26], [27].
Emotional contagion is closely related to human movement
[28], [29], [30]. In this subsection, we introduce some repre-
sentative works about emotional contagion [4].
The epidemiological susceptible-infectious-recovered
(SIR) model [31] divides the individuals in a crowd into
three categories: infected, susceptible, and recovered. The
analysis of the spread of epidemic among these three groups
has also been extended to other fields. In [32], the extended
model is used to simulate the spread of rumors. Some re-
searchers use the epidemiological SIR model in conjunction
with other models to describe emotion propagation under
specific situations. In [5], the epidemiological SIR model
is improved by combining it with the OCEAN (openness,
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, neuroticism)
personality model [33]. In [34], a qualitatively simulated
approach to model emotional contagion is proposed for
large-scale emergency evacuation. The method shows that
the effectiveness of rescue guidance is influenced by the
leading emotions in a crowd. Moreover, in [15], the cellular
automata model based on the SIR model (CA-SIRS) is used
to describe emotional contagion in a crowd during an emer-
gency, capturing the dynamic process “susceptible-infected-
recovered-susceptible.” However, in some case, people only
need to consider two emotional states: infected and sus-
ceptible. Hill et al. [35] evaluate the spread of long-term
emotional states across a social network based on the clas-
sical SIS (Susceptible Infected Susceptible) model. Cai et
al. [36] combine the OCEAN and SIS models to simulate
emotional contagion on crowd evacuation. Song et al. [37]
discuss the factors influencing individual evacuation de-
cision making in the view of social contagion based on
Susceptible-Infective (SI) model. Emotional contagion can
also be used in traffic simulation [38], [39], [40] and crowd
queuing simulation [41].
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Fig. 1: Overview of our ACSEE model. (a) Crowd violence occurs. Civilians, activists, and cops are specified in our model
and they can perceive environmental information. The basic attributes of these agents are introduced in Section 4.2. (b)
Our antagonistic emotional contagion method consists of two components: mental emotion and external emotion. After the
outbreak of the crowd violence, the antagonistic emotions of each agent are updated at each time step (Section 4.3). (c) We
calculate the antagonistic emotion and deterrent force of each agent. The situation of the cops and activists is determined
based on the deterrent force, which is defined according to antagonistic emotion. The game between antagonistic cops
and activists is carried out in different situations. Agents use different strategies to carry out game interactions and their
benefits are analyzed (Section 4.4). Their strategies are evolved over time using the evolutionary learning method. (d)
We present behavior control method based on deterrent force, strategy, and benefit (Section 4.5). Agents choose rational
movement directions and actions and their positions are updated. We use step (b) to calculate the positions of all the agents
at the next time step. (e) If the crowd violence subsides, the incident ends.
A thermodynamic-based emotional contagion model is
introduced by Bosse et al. [42] in the ASCRIBE system. The
authors use a multi-agent based approach to define emo-
tional contagion within groups. Their study focuses on the
emotions of a collective entity rather than the emotions of
single individuals. Neto et al. [6] adapt the model proposed
by Bosse et al. [43] into BioCrowds and cope with different
groups of agents. Tsai et al. [44] present an emotional con-
tagion model that spreads the highest level of emotion to
surrounding agents in their ESCAPES framework. In [45],
dynamic emotion propagation is described from the per-
spective of social psychology, combining thermodynamic-
based models and epidemiological-based models.
According to the behaviors of different agents in antag-
onistic scenarios, we define three kinds of agents. Each kind
of agents is assigned a role separately: civilians, activists,
and cops. Because of the antagonism between agents with
different roles, the above-mentioned emotional contagion
models can’t be directly applied to crowd violent scenes. In
this paper, we propose antagonistic emotions. Antagonistic
emotions are the opposite emotions of agents in different
roles. Different roles of agents come from opposing groups
in crowd violent scenes. In our model the emotions of cops
and activists are the antagonistic emotions. Antagonistic
emotional contagion is the emotional contagion process of
antagonistic agents in different roles under certain situa-
tions. Our antagonistic emotional contagion method can
quantitatively characterize dynamic changes in the antag-
onistic emotions between different roles.
2.2 Evolutionary game theory
In this subsection, we summarize some representative
works about evolutionary game theory.
Evolutionary game theory has solved many biological
problems. For example, in [46], genome-driven evolutionary
game theory helps to explain the rise of metabolic interde-
pendencies in microbial communities.
Some researchers have applied evolutionary game the-
ory to the recommendation system. Saab et al. [47] use
classical and spatial evolutionary game theory as a possible
solution to the Sybil attack in recommender systems. Li et al.
[48] propose a new stability analysis of repeated games and
evolutionary games based on a subset of Nash equilibrium.
Evolutionary game theory can help us understand the
behaviors of individuals better. Huang et al. [49] present
a model in which every mutation leads to a new game
between the mutants and the residents based on a evolu-
tionary game theoretic approach. Evolutionary game theory
is one of the most effective approaches to understand and
analyze widespread cooperative behaviors among individ-
uals [50]. In [51], the combination of evolutionary game
theory and graph theory provides an extended framework
to investigate cooperative behavior in social systems. Quek
et al. [12] focus on the development of a spatial evolution-
ary multiagent social network to study the macroscopic-
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behavioral dynamics of civil violence due to microscopic
game-theoretic interactions between goal-oriented agents.
Some previous works [12], [52] study antagonistic crowd
behaviors in crowd violence incidents based on evolution-
ary game theory but do not fully consider the differences
of antagonistic emotions and deterrent forces of agents
with different roles. In this paper, we further improve the
evolutionary game theoretic method. At first, game in our
model is established between opposing groups (cops and
activists). When these agents confront different scenarios
and situations, they adopt different strategies such as defec-
tion or cooperation to get higher benefits and less casualties.
Evolutionary game theory is a modeling approach of strate-
gic interactions among agents in crowd violent incidents
based on natural selection mechanism. Natural selection
mechanism means that more offspring will be produced
by more fit biological organisms in a given environment.
We use evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategies
and benefits of agents. Our model incorporates antagonistic
emotions into evolutionary game theory to describe the
differences between agents, which estimates situations of
antagonistic scenes more accurately.
2.3 Agent-based crowd simulation
Agent-based model is a kind of versatile method can sim-
ulate complex scenarios. In an agent-based model, all the
agents are endowed with greater autonomy and have their
own inherent attributes and properties. Agents can receive
information from the surrounding environment, which will
influence their actions and decisions [53]. They have sep-
arate velocities and moving directions. Hence, an agent-
based model can produce complex crowd behaviors. In con-
trast to agent-based models, flow-based and particle-based
models cannot accurately describe the differences between
agents [54]. A flow-based model is mainly used to simulate
high-density crowds and has no individuals or groups.
A particle-based model cannot model high-level decision-
making behaviors. Therefore, we integrate the proposed
model with an agent-based method. In this subsection, we
summarize this kind of methods.
An agent-based approach is the most common way
to simulate crowd movements [55]. Kountouriotis et al.
[54] use the agent-based model to simulate thousands of
agents in real time, which integrates a high level of indi-
vidual parametrization, such as group behaviors between
friends and between a leader and a follower. Luo et al.
[56] introduce a novel framework for proactive steering in
agent-based crowd simulation. The Social Forces Model is
combined with an agent-based method to simulate crowds
[57]. In this model, repulsive and tangential forces of each
agent are introduced to avoid collisions with surrounding
agents and obstacles. However, all the agents share the same
attributes and move with the same speed, which doesn’t
conform to real-world scenarios.
Some agent-based methods are used to simulate crowd
movements in emergency scenarios. In these scenarios, the
emotional state of an agent is a very important influencing
factor in simulating realistic behaviors. Shendarkar et al.
[58] present a novel crowd simulation model for emergency
response using BDI (belief, desire, intention) agents. Luo
et al. [59] describe the human-like decision-making process
based on various physiological, emotional, and social group
attributes for agents under normal and emergency situa-
tions. Aydt et al. [60] propose an emotion model integrated
with an agent-based method in serious games based on
modern appraisal theory. In contrast to the above meth-
ods, which don’t involve antagonistic scenes or emotions
between agents in different roles, our method focuses on
antagonistic emotions and the relationship between antago-
nistic emotions and evolutionary game theory.
TABLE 1: The parameters used in our ACSEE model.
Notation Description
PR The radius of perceived range
eexi External emotion of agent i
emei Mental emotion of agent i
∆eexi,j (t)
The increase in the strength of agent i’s external
emotion received from agent j at time t
∆eexc (t)
The increment of external emotion of agent c at
time t
∆benei (t)
The difference of the benefits of the games at time
t and t− 1 for agent i
∆emei (t)
The increment of the mental emotion of agent i at
time t
∆ei (t)
The increment of the total emotion of agent i at
time t
ei (t) The total emotion of agent i at time t
Ta2c
If the emotion value of an activist exceeds the
threshold Ta2c, role transition from activist to
civilian occurs.
Tc2a
If the emotion value of a civilian less than the
threshold Tc2a , role transition from civilian to
activist occurs.
fi (t) The deterrent force of agent i at time t
Fi (t)
The total deterrent force of agents of the same type
for agent i at time t
Fˆi (t)
The total deterrent force of his or her opponents in
the cells neighboring agent i at time t
∆Fi
The difference of the total deterrent forces between
cops and activists that agent i can perceive at time
t
Pdie The death probability
Twarn The early warning threshold
warn time The time of early warning
Twarn time The time of early warning threshold
3 OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
In this section, we introduce some basic and important
concepts about crowd behavior simulation and crowd emo-
tional contagion. We also give an overview of our method.
3.1 Crowd behavior simulation
Crowd behavior simulation can be defined as a process of
emulating or simulating the movement of large amount of
entities, characters or agents [61]. At a broad level, crowd
movement is governed by psychological status of individu-
als and their surrounding environment [22]. When humans
form a crowd, interaction becomes an essential part of the
overall crowd movement [5]. For agent-based methods of
crowd simulation used in this paper, each agent is as-
sumed as an independent decision-making entity, which has
knowledge of the environment and a desired goal position
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at each step of the simulation. The interactions between
an agent with others or with the environment are often
performed at a local level [62]. A typical crowd simulation
model can be defined as in Equation 1. P t represents the
positions of all the agents in the scene at time t and P t+1
is the positions of all the agents at time t + 1, which can be
induced by crowd simulation model f .
P t+1 = f(P t) (1)
3.2 Crowd emotional contagion
Crowd simulation research has recently taken a new di-
rection for modeling emotion of individuals to generate
believable, heterogeneous crowd behaviors. Emotion of an
agent can greatly affect its ability to perceive, learn, behave,
and communicate within the surrounding environment [5].
The emotion owned by one agent provides information
about other agents’ behavioral intentions and modulates
his or her behavioral decision-making process. Based on
their appraisal of the environment, emotions of the agents
in a crowd are updated dynamically at different time. In
antagonistic scenes, such emotional changes become more
obvious and play a vital role in crowd interaction behaviors.
As shown in Equation 2, the emotion values of all the agents
Et+1 at time t + 1 can be computed according to their
relative positions P t and emotions of the agents Et at time
t.
Et+1 = g(Et, P t) (2)
3.3 Overview of our ACSEE model
This paper mainly discusses the influence of antagonistic
emotions on agents’ behaviors, whose purpose is to com-
pute and update the status of all the agents at different
time steps according to their emotions and roles. The crowd
emotion is fully integrated into crowd behavior simulation,
also with considering the confrontation between agents
with different roles, such as civilians, activists, and cops.
Given the positions P t, the emotions Et, and the roles Rt
of all the agents at time t, our crowd simulation model
ACSEE(P t, Et) estimates the positions P t+1, the emotions
Et+1, and the roles Rt+1 of all the agents at next time step
as Equation 3.
{P t+1, Et+1, Rt+1} = ACSEE(f(P t−1), g(Et−1, P t−1), Rt)
= ACSEE(P t, Et, Rt)
(3)
4 ACSEE MODEL
We present a novelAntagonistic Crowd behavior Simulation
model (ACSEE) based on Emotional contagion and
Evolutionary game theories. Our model consists of three
important modules: antagonistic emotional contagion, an-
tagonistic evolutionary gaming, and behavior control. The
antagonistic emotional contagion method is designed by
combining the enhanced SIS and game approaches. Using
the antagonistic emotions of agents, we define their deter-
rent forces in Section 4.4. The enhanced evolutionary game
theoretic approach is determined based on the deterrent
forces of agents. Our ACSEE model computes the behavior
of each agent by modeling the influence from antagonistic
emotional contagion and evolutionary game theories. The
flowchart of our ACSEE model is presented in Figure 1.
4.1 Symbols and Notations
For convenience, the important parameters used in the
ACSEE model and their descriptions are listed in Table 1.
4.2 Agent modeling in antagonistic scenes
In this section, we mainly describe the role of different kinds
of agents and the assumptions we formulated.
4.2.1 Civilians, activists, and cops
Crowd violence incidents are often caused by some serious
social contradictions, where a certain amount of activists
challenge or break the normal and peaceful social order
or stability in different ways of violence such as large-
scale gathering, group activities, and physical conflicts. We
classify the agents in the crowd under such situations as
civilians, activists, or cops based on their roles according to
[12], [63].
Civilians are neutral agents in the environment and pose
no danger to the central authority. In general, civilians are
vulnerable groups and do not participate in confrontation.
The cops do their best to protect civilians while the activists
persecute them. However, civilians may change their roles if
conditions are favorable to express their anger and frustra-
tion publicly. For example, because of the instigation of the
surrounding activists, the civilians may turn into activists
to participate in the riot. Activists aim to create havoc and
fuel the ongoing unrest while avoiding being defeated by
cops. Cops maintain public order by suppressing activists
and play a key role in preventing terrorist attack. In real-
world scenarios, cops and activists can represent any two an-
tagonistic groups [13]. Civilians can also represent onlookers
and neutral parties.
4.2.2 Assumptions
Antagonistic crowds arise for many complex influencing
factors. The simulation of antagonistic crowd behaviors
considering all the influencing factors is an insoluble prob-
lem. From the observations of the real antagonistic crowd
behaviors, we formulate the following assumptions to make
this problem solvable.
• Emotions of cops are positive while those of activists
are negative. Civilians are neutral agents. The pro-
cess of emotional contagion can change their emo-
tions. Cops with high positive emotions will make
the agents around them more positive. Activists with
high negative emotions will make the agents around
them more negative. Civilians don’t actively affect
the emotions of surrounding agents [5].
• An agent can maintain a perceived range that is
centered around it. We regard the perceived range
of an agent as a circular area with a fixed radius PR
[5], [64].
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• Agents use different strategies to interact with their
opposing agents. Agents’ strategies refer to the ac-
tions taken during the games. According to the en-
countered situation, activists and cops can adopt one
of two different strategies: cooperation or defection
[12], [65]. The cooperation strategy of activists means
accepting peaceful settlements and running away
from the cops. The activists with defection strategy
will revolt aggressively and instigate civilians to
revolt. The cops with cooperation strategy keep away
from large gatherings of activists to protect civilians.
The defection strategy of cops means pursuing ac-
tivists.
• The agent may be classified as death. Dead agents
are subdued by their opponents and pose no threat
any more. It doesn’t mean biological death.
4.3 Antagonistic emotional contagion module
Since emotion has an important influence on people’s be-
havior decision-making, accurate emotion modeling is es-
sential and fundamental for a crowd simulation model
[5]. In this section, we present our antagonistic emotional
contagion module. Emotions in our model incorporate the
antagonism between agents in different roles. ei denotes the
emotion of agent i. ei ∈ (−1, 1) and ei 6= 0. There are two
different types of emotion: positive emotion and negative
emotion. When the emotion value is greater than 0, the
emotion is positive. The higher the emotion value of an
agent, the more positive his/her emotion. When the emotion
value is less than 0, the emotion of the agent becomes
negative. The lower the emotion value of an agent, the more
negative his/her emotion. When an emotion value is closer
to 0, the agent is regarded as being in a peaceful state and he
or she tends to be conservative. The descriptions of different
emotion values of different roles are listed in Table 2.
TABLE 2: The descriptions of different emotion values of
different roles
Descriptions of emotion EmotionCloser to 1 Closer to 0 Closer to−1
Roles
Cops
high morale;
brave in subduing
the activists
peaceful
low morale;
afraid of activists;
dare not to fight with activists
Activists escape from copsnot challenging cops peaceful arrogant and attack cops
Civilians brave;not fear of activists peaceful
uneasy, suffering,
fear of activists, and obeyed
In such an antagonistic game scenario, individuals will
be influenced by external and internal stimuli. External
stimuli mainly come from the external environment and
are often accepted by individuals passively. Internal stimuli
come from the subjective perception and judgment of indi-
viduals by themselves. Both the internal and external stimuli
in the antagonistic scenarios are able to produce emotions,
so the emotion of an agent ei consists of two parts. The first
part is the external emotion eexi , which is influenced by
surrounding agents. The second part is the mental emotion
emei [66], which is determined by an agent’s own subjective
consciousness. Therefore, the final emotion value is defined
as follows [67], [68]:
ei = e
ex
i + e
me
i (4)
4.3.1 External emotion
Our method for calculating external emotion is inspired by
the emotional contagion model in [15]. An agent can be
affected by others in his or her perceived range. The increase
in the strength of external emotion of agent i (∆eexi,j (t))
received from agent j at time t is defined as:
∆eexi,j(t) = [1−
1
(1 + exp(−L)) ]× ei(t)×Aj,i ×Bi,j (5)
where L represents the distance between agent i and j,
ei denotes the emotion of agent i, Aj,i is the intensity of
emotion received by i from sender j, andBi,j is the intensity
of emotion which is sent from i to receiver j.
Civilians can only passively receive the emotional conta-
gion from surrounding agents and cannot actively influence
others. The increment of external emotion of agent o at
time t is denoted as ∆eexo (t). ∆e
ex
o (t) includes emotional
influences received from all the cops and activists in the
perceived range of agent o . ∆eexo (t) is defined as follows:
∆eexo (t) =
k∑
i=1
∆eexo,ci(t) +
n∑
j=1
∆eexo,aj (t) (6)
where ∆eexo,ci (t) and ∆e
ex
o,aj (t) denote the increase in the
strength of the external emotion transmitted from cop ci
and activist aj to agent o.
4.3.2 Mental emotion
Each agent establishes game play with agents in the oppos-
ing group who are in his or her perceived range. Because
civilians are neutral members and remain peaceful, we
assume that no game interaction will occur between civilian
agents. The benefits of each game are determined according
to the method outlined in Section 4.4. Mental emotion is
defined as the difference between the benefits of two games
and the mental emotion of civilians is a constant [69].
The difference between the benefits of the games at time
t and t−1 for agent i is denoted as ∆benei (t) = benei (t)−
benei (t− 1). The threshold that leads to emotional fluctua-
tions is δ. The relationship between the increment of mental
emotion and the difference between the benefits at time t is
defined by:
∆emei (t) =

rand(−0.01, 0.01), |∆benei(t)| < δ
0.1
δ+exp(δ/∆benei(t))
, ∆benei(t) ≥ δ
− 0.1δ+exp(∆benei(t)/δ) , ∆benei(t) ≤ −δ
(7)
In Equation 7, |∆benei (t)| < δ means that the difference
between benefits fails to reach the emotional fluctuation
threshold δ. Therefore, there is little change in the emotion
of agent i. In this case, the mental emotion value is a random
number on the interval (-0.01, 0.01). ∆benei (t) ≥ δ means
that the benefit at time t is higher than that at time t−1. The
benefit increase makes the cops more positive and activists
more negative. ∆benei (t) ≤ −δ means that the difference
between the benefits of time t and t − 1 is higher than the
emotional fluctuation threshold δ. The benefit at time t is
lower than that at time t − 1. The benefit decrease makes
cops more negative and activists more positive.
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4.3.3 Emotion updating
Our emotion updating method for agents is presented in
Figure 2. The mental and external emotions of each agent
are updated according to the evolution of the games and
changes in agents’ locations. The external emotion of an
agent is determined by the emotional contagion (external
stimulus) of surrounding cops and activists. The differences
between the benefits of games (internal stimulus), which is
defined in Section 4.3.2, lead to the changes in the mental
emotions of cops and activists.
Fig. 2: Emotion updating method. The benefit of the
game between cops and activists is the internal stimulus,
which leads to the changes in mental emotions. Emotional
contagion among different kinds of agents is the external
stimulus, which leads to the changes in external emotions.
The increment of the total emotion (∆eo (t)) of agent o at
time t is defined as follows:
∆eo(t) = ∆e
ex
o (t) + ∆e
me
o (t) (8)
For each time step, the total emotion value is updated.
At time t, the total emotion value of agent o is defined as
follows:
eo(t) = eo(t− 1) + ∆eo(t) (9)
4.4 Antagonistic evolutionary gaming module
In our model an agent establishes game play with all the
agents from the opposing group within his or her perceived
range, according to game theory. When agents confront dif-
ferent scenarios and situations, they adopt different strate-
gies and get varying benefits. They aim to maximize their
benefits and minimize casualties according to the current
situation. In this subsection, we present the evolutionary
game theoretic module of our model, which is used to
analyze the strategies and benefits of agents.
At first, agents estimate surrounding situations based on
the deterrent forces of the agents in their perceived range.
Deterrent force is a kind of power by which an agent can
beat his or her opponents and is closely related to the agent’s
behavior. Emotion plays a crucial role in agents’ deterrent
forces [70]. The deterrent force of agent i is defined in the
following equation:
fi (t) = sin
(
|ei (t)| · pi
2
)
(10)
where ei (t) is the emotion of agent i at time t. The more
positive or negative the emotion of an agent is, the greater
the deterrent force the agent possesses [70]. The total deter-
rent forces are defined as follows:
Fi (t) =
∑
k∈A
fk (t) (11)
Fˆi (t) =
∑
kˆ∈Aˆ
fkˆ (t) (12)
where the set A denotes agents of the same type in the
perceived range of agent i and the set of the opposing agents
in the perceived range of agent i is Aˆ.
The situation is defined according to the difference be-
tween the total deterrent forces of cops and activists per-
ceived by agent i, which is expressed in Equation 13, as
follows.
∆Fi = Fi (t)− Fˆi (t) (13)
Under different situations, the benefits gained during the
games are different. The benefit matrix is defined according
to varying situations. In contrast, the benefit matrix defined
in [12] is based on the number of cops and activists and
assumes that the deterrent forces of all the agents are the
same. Instead, we define the benefit matrix based on the
deterrent forces of cops and activists. We fully account for
the differences between the deterrent forces of all the agents,
which conforms to real-world scenes. The benefit matrix
corresponding to different situations is shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3: Benefit matrix of cops and activists. ∆F denotes
the situations of cops and activists. ∆F > 0 means that the
total deterrent force of the cops is higher than that of the
activists. ∆F < 0 and ∆F = 0 are defined in a similar
way. Activists and cops can adopt two different strategies:
cooperation or defection. We list the benefits of cops and
activists corresponding to different situations. For example,
the ratio of the benefits of the cops using a cooperation
strategy to the activists using a cooperation strategy is 1:4
when ∆F > 0. The ratio of the benefits of the cops using
a cooperation strategy to the activists using a defection
strategy is 2:2 when ∆F > 0 [12]
Situations Benefit
Strategy of activists
Cooperation Defection
∆F > 0
Strategy
of
cops
Cooperation 1,4 2,2
Defection 3,3 4,1
∆F < 0
Cooperation 4,1 3,3
Defection 2,2 1,4
∆F = 0
Cooperation 3,3 0,5
Defection 5,0 1,1
When the total deterrent force of the cops is higher
than that of the activists (∆F > 0), if both groups adopt
a strategy of cooperation, cops miss an opportunity to make
arrests. Compared with activists, cops reap fewer benefits. If
both groups defect, cops gain the upper hand because they
have a higher total deterrent force and therefore reap more
benefits. If cops cooperate and activists defect, both groups’
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benefits remain relatively neutral. Cops should defect to
confront activists while activists should cooperate to avoid
challenging cops and inviting casualties. If cops defect and
activists cooperate, cops exert dominance over activists and
activists avoid direct conflict. Therefore, both groups obtain
benefits. When the total deterrent force of cops is less than or
equal to that of activists (∆F < 0 or ∆F = 0), their benefits
are defined similarly.
After a game, the strategies of cops and activists are
updated according to the results of that game. Each agent is
defined by a binary string. This string encodes the strategy
bits in different situations. This string suggests the strategies
an agent should adopt when ∆F = 0, when ∆F > 0, and
when ∆F < 0. Then the effectiveness or benefit of each
strategy is calculated. The more beneficial strategy is chosen
and it will be passed on to the offspring in an attempt to
create a better strategy.
4.5 Behavior control module
The behavior control method of agents is determined by
antagonistic emotional contagion and evolutionary game
theoretic approaches. In this section, we present some rules
about how agents determine their positions at the next time
step and their living states.
Agents determine their positions at the next time step
based on the cellular automaton model [15]. A cellular
space of M × N cells is defined and each agent occupies
one cell. At each time step, agents choose to move to their
neighboring cells or stay still.
Whether an agent moves or not depends on the deterrent
forces exhibited by his or her neighboring agents. For a cop
or an activist, this is divided into the following possible
cases according to real-world videos:
• If the total deterrent force of agents in the opposing
group is higher than that of agents of the same type
in agent i’ s neighboring cells, he or she has to move.
The moving direction of agent i is determined by
the expected benefits of his or her neighboring cells.
At first, the neighboring cells around agent i will be
checked to find the empty ones (an empty cell means
that there is not an agent in it). Then the expected
benefits of all the empty cells are calculated. The cell
with the highest benefit is the position to which agent
i will move.
• Next we consider the situation where the total de-
terrent force of the opposing agents is less than that
of agents of the same type in agent i’s neighboring
cells. If agent i’s strategy is defection, he or she will
move to the nearest opposing agent (i.e. attack the
opposing agent). If agent i’s strategy is cooperation,
he or she will stay away from opposing agents and
move to the nearest civilian. If agent i is a cop, he or
she will protect the civilian. If agent i is an activist,
he or she will attack the civilian. In this case, agent i
may also choose to stay still.
• Agent i with no neighbors chooses to move. The
moving direction is the same as the situation where
the total deterrent force of the opposing agents is less
than that of agents of the same type.
• Civilians move to safer positions where there are
more cops around them.
The agent with a defection strategy attacks his or her
opponents. The agent may be dead. A dead agent in this
case means being subdued by his or her opponents and
therefore posing no threat to these opponents. It doesn’t
mean real death. At each time step, the death probability of
each agent is calculated and denoted as Pdie. In contrast to
the definition in [12], which is based on the number of cops
and activists, we define Pdie based on the total deterrent
forces of cops and activists.
Pdie = 1− exp
(
ln0.1 ·
∑
Fi∑ _
F i
)
(14)
where
∑
Fi represents the total deterrent force of agents of
the same type, and
∑
F̂i represents the total deterrent force
of his or her opponents in the cells neighboring agent i.∑
Fi∑_
F
i
denotes the total deterrent force of the cop-to-activist
ratio within the perceived range of agent i. ln0.1 is set to
ensure a plausible value (Pdie = 0.9) when
∑
Fi =
∑ _
F i
[12], [71].
Each agent has an early warning threshold Twarn. When
the value of Pdie exceeds the threshold Twarn, the value
of warn time increases by 1. When the value of warn time
exceeds the threshold Twarn time, the agent will die. Because
the endurance of each agent is different, the values of the
thresholds Twarn and Twarn time are also different for each
agent.
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
We have implemented our model using Visual C++ to sim-
ulate antagonistic crowd behaviors based on Unity3D . The
computing environment is a common PC with a quadcore
2.50 GHz CPU,16 GB memory, and an Nvidia GeForce GTX
1080 Ti graphics card.
TABLE 4: List of parameter values used in our simulation
Scenario
Number of agents
Size of 2-D Grid Ta2c Tc2a
Emotion
Civilians Activists Cops Civilians Activists Cops
No.1:Activists attack
civilians
80 50 40 20×20 squares 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.5
No.2:Role transitions 80 50 70 20×20 squares 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.5
No.3:Cops encircling
activists
80 50 70 20×20 squares 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.5
No.4:Real-world 1 10 50 30 20×20 squares 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.5
No.5:Real-world 2 80 50 30 20×20 squares 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.5
No.6:Real-world 3 3 14 40 20×20 squares 1 -1 0.1
-0.1
and
-0.3
0.9
No.7:Real-world 4 0 30 100 40×40 squares 1 -1 0 -0.2 0.8
No.8:Real-world 5 100 30 100 40×40 squares 1 -1 0.1
-0.9
and
-0.2
0.9
No.9:ACSEE vs. CVM 80 50 30 20×20 squares 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.5
We run a series of experiments involving varying role
number ratios in outdoor scenarios. The parameter val-
ues in different scenarios used in the simulation runs are
listed in Table 4. The perceived range PR of agents is 10,
Twarn ∈ [0.7, 0.9], and Twarn time ∈ [8, 20]. Figures 3, 6,
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 3: The numbers of three types of agents at different time steps according to different initial Rca (the ratio of cops to
activists): (a) Rca is 0 (0 cops), (b) Rca is 0.6 (30 cops), (c) Rca is 0.8 (40 cops), (d) Rca is 1 (50 cops), (e) Rca is 1.2 (60 cops),
(f) Rca is 1.4 (70 cops), and (g) Rca is 1.6 (80 cops). (h) Active ratio curves for different initial Rcas. (a) shows a steep drop
in the number of civilians. The number of activists remains the same because there are no cops to fight with the activists.
We can see from (a) to (g) that the number of dead activists increases as Rca increases. When Rca is 1.2, all the activists
have been subdued by cops. The time required for all the activists to be subdued by cops decreases as Rca increases. The
civilian survival time lengthens and there are more surviving civilians as Rca increases. We can see that there is an initial
rise in the number of civilians in (f) and (g) because the total deterrent force of the cops is much higher than that of the
activists. Some activists change their roles (from activist to civilian). (h) shows the overview of active ratios (ratios of the
activists to the sum of the activists and civilians) corresponding to different Rcas. An inverse relationship between the
active ratio and the Rca is presented. Therefore, increasing the ratio of cops can help subdue activists.
7, 9, and 12 report the results of 200 runs. The average of
the 200 runs is the final result. We investigate the effect of
varying role number ratios on the crowd violence results
(in Section 5.1). By analyzing the simulation results, we find
that our model can account for many emergent phenomena
(discussed in Section 5.3). Next, we study how different
important factors influence crowd violence. In Section 5.4
we show the impact of emotional contagion on the results
of crowd violence. We compare the different simulation
results with or without considering emotional contagion.
In Section 5.5, the relationship between the deterrent force
and the strategy is revealed. The strategies adopted by each
agent in different situations are analyzed. In Section 5.6,
our simulation results are compared with the real-world
videos and the simulation results generated by different
models. The real-world videos are chosen from the public
dataset and real antagonistic events. More details about
comparisons can be seen in the supplementary video. User
studies are performed to evaluate our method in Section 5.7.
5.1 The impact of ratios of agents in different roles on
the result of crowd violence
We investigate the effects of varying ratios of agents in
different roles on the results of crowd violence. By analyzing
a large number of real-world antagonistic videos, we select
several representative values of Rca (the ratio of cops to
Fig. 4: The positions of all the agents at the 168th frame
(Rca is 1). The green, purple, and blue circles represent
civilians, activists, and cops, respectively. The stronger the
color intensity of a circle, the higher the deterrent force of
the agent.
activists). In this section the initial Rcas are 0, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1.2,
1.4, and 1.6. The initial numbers of civilians and activists are
80 and 50, respectively. The initial emotion values of all the
activists and cops are -0.5 and 0.5, respectively.
We can learn from Figure 3 that the number of different
kinds of agents determines the outcome of crowd violence
to some extent. When we increase the ratio of cops, they can
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
Fig. 5: Some fascinating emergent phenomena our model uncovers. (a), (b), and (c) are the simulations of activists attacking
civilians. (d), (e), and (f) are the simulations of role transitions. (g), (h), and (i) are the simulations of cops encircling activists.
The green, purple, blue, and grey circles are civilians, activists, cops, and dead agents, respectively. The stronger the color
intensity of a circle, the higher the deterrent force of the agent.
subdue activists quickly, stabilize the situation, and reduce
civilian casualties. When Rca is 1, it means that the initial
total deterrent force of the cops is equal to that of the
activists. Both cops and activists have the same probability
of winning. However, in the end, the cops fail which means
that all the cops are subdued by the activists. We offer a
detailed explanation in the following analysis.
Figure 4 shows the positions of all the agents at the 168th
frame when Rca is 1. At this time step, the numbers of cops
and activists are the same. Activists with strong deterrent
forces are mainly located in the upper right corner of the
scene. Some cops with weak deterrent forces are among
the crowd of activists (upper right corner of the scene).
Some surrounding civilians turn into activists because of
the incitement of the activists with high deterrent forces.
The cops with strong deterrent forces are in the upper left
corner of the scene, which makes it difficult for them to
rescue the cops in the upper right corner. When the cops
with weak deterrent forces are killed by the activists with
strong deterrent forces, there are fewer cops left. Finally, all
the activists get together to attack the remaining cops and
the activists win.
We learn from Figure 4 that activists participate in
collective behavior to create regions of low cop-to-activist
ratios, which reduces the chances of activist death. The
conglomeration of scattered activists into small groups and
the amalgamation of small groups into large ones make
it difficult to wipe them out [71]. Although the number
of agents determines the outcome of crowd violence to
a certain extent, some take advantage of agents’ spatial
distributions to affect the outcome of crowd violence.
5.2 The impact of agent parameters on the result of
crowd violence
In this section we analyze the impact of agent parameters
on the result of crowd violence. We choose two parameters
which have great influences on the simulation results: PR
(the radius of perceived range) and A or B in Equation
5. In Equation 5, Aj,i is the strength attribute by which
an emotion is received by i from sender j and Bi,j is the
strength attribute by which an emotion is sent from i to
receiver j. We discuss the relationship between active ratios
(ratios of activists to the sum of the activists and civilians)
and the parameters. The initial numbers of the civilians,
activists, and cops are 80, 50, and 70, respectively. The initial
emotions of the civilians, activists, and cops are 0.1, -0.5, and
0.5, respectively. The initial total deterrent force of the cops
is higher than that of the activists.
We show active ratios according to various values of PR
in Figure 6. We assume that all individuals have the same
PR. When PR of agents are different, the results of active
ratios are also different. With the increase of PR, agents can
more accurately estimate the situations. Therefore, the high
total deterrent force of cops plays a role in defeating the
activists. The active ratio decreases with the increase of PR.
In addition, we also discuss the relationship between
the values of A or B and active ratios in Figure 7. A and
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Fig. 6: Active ratios corresponding to different PRs (the
radius of perceived range). The active ratio decreases with
the increase of PR. When PR is greater than 10, the active
ratio tends to be stable. We choose PR = 10 in this paper.
Fig. 7: Active ratios corresponding to different values of A.
The active rate decreases with the increases of A. When A
is greater than 0.8, the active ratio tends to be stable. We
choose A = 0.8 in this paper.
B are very important parameters for emotional contagion
in Equation 5. The values of them are positively correlated
with the values of emotional contagion. We suppose all the
strength attributes of A between any two individuals are the
same and those of B between any two individuals are the
same. The relationship between the active ratio and A is the
same as that between the active ratio and B. We take A as
an example to discuss this relationship. As the value of A
increases, agents’ emotions also increase and the difference
between the total deterrent forces of cops and activists is
greater. Due to the high deterrent force of cops, more and
more activists are subdued by cops. Therefore when the
value of A increases, the active rate decreases.
5.3 Emergent phenomena uncovered by our model
Our model can simulate many emergent phenomena that
conform to real-world scenes. Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c show
Fig. 8: Simulation of antagonistic crowd behavior using 3D
character models.
that activists with strong deterrent forces attack civilians. At
the top left corner of this scene, there are a lot of civilians.
Many activists are at the lower right corner of Figure 5a.
Agents of the same type gather together according to [72].
Therefore, it is reasonable that agents of the same type
gather together. The number of activists is larger than that of
the cops. We can see from Figure 5a that the total deterrent
force of the activists is stronger than that of the cops.
Activists attack civilians (Figure 5b) and more and more
civilians die (Figures 5b and 5c).
At the lower right corner of Figure 5d, there are plenty of
cops with high deterrent forces near the highlighted activist
and his deterrent force is weak. If he continues to resist,
he will die. He therefore transitions roles (from activist
to civilian). When all the other activists die, he survives
(Figure 5f). When the number of surrounding activists is
large enough, it may impel civilians to become activists [73].
In Figure 5g, there are many more cops than activists.
The total deterrent force of the cops is much stronger than
that of the activists. At first, the cops divide the activists
into two groups (Figure 5g) and prevent the activists from
gathering together to form a larger group. Next, the cops
eliminate these two groups of activists individually. There
are some activists in the left side of the scene (the first
group). Cops encircle these activists and more activists will
die. When all the activists on the left side are eliminated,
the cops return to the activists on the right side of the scene
(the second group). These activists are encircled by the cops.
Finally, all the activists are killed by the cops and the cops
win.
Figure 8 shows the simulation of antagonistic crowd
behavior using 3D character models. The activists with high
deterrent forces on the left of the scene are not afraid of
the cops with low deterrent forces. In the upper left corner
of the scene, the activists with high deterrent forces attack
a civilian. The civilian runs away from the activists. In the
middle and lower part of the scene, the cop with a high
deterrent force attacks the activist and he runs away from
the cop.
5.4 The impact of emotional contagion on the result of
crowd violence
The impact of emotional contagion on the results of crowd
violence is presented in Figure 9. The initial numbers of
civilians, activists, and cops are 80, 50, and 40, respectively.
In Figure 9a, the initial emotion values of the cops are higher
than those of the activists. At the 53rd time step, the number
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(a) (b)
Fig. 9: The changes in the number of civilians, activists,
and cops: (a) considering emotional contagion and (b) not
considering emotional contagion.
(a) (b)
Fig. 10: Simulation results (a) considering emotional con-
tagion and (b) not considering emotional contagion. In (a)
the deterrent forces of the agents are different and the same
types of agents are more likely to gather together. In (b) the
deterrent forces of all the agents are the same and the same
type of agents are dispersed.
of activists is zero. All the activists have been wiped out by
the cops. At first the number of civilians increases because
the total deterrent force of the cops is much higher than
that of the activists. Some activists change their role (from
activist to civilian). In Figure 9b, all the agents without
emotion have the same deterrent force. At the 41st time step,
the number of cops is zero and the activists win.
We can learn from Figure 9 that the emotion module of
our model can describe the differences observed between
the agents. In our model, the deterrent forces of all the
agents are different according to their emotions. The greater
the absolute value of an agent’s emotion, the higher the
deterrent force of that agent. Although the number of agents
is small, it is still possible to overcome a larger group of
opponents by improving the emotions and deterrent forces
of them. Therefore, our model can simulate situations in
which agents overcome their more numerous opponents.
Figure 10 shows simulation results with and without
considering emotion. In Figure 10a the deterrent forces of
the agents are different. The stronger the color intensity of
a circle, the higher the deterrent force of the agent. Because
of emotional contagion, the same types of agents are more
likely to gather together, which is similar to what happens in
real-world scenarios [72]. In Figure 10b the deterrent forces
of all the agents are the same and the same type of agents
are more dispersed.
Figure 11 shows the heat maps of antagonistic emotion.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 11: The heat maps of antagonistic emotion: (a) heat
map at the 5th time step, (b) heat map at the 17th time step,
(c) heat map at the 27th time step, and (d) heat map at the
42th time step. The red area represents the emotions of the
cops. The blue area represents the emotions of the activists.
The stronger the color intensity, the larger the value of the
emotion.
Fig. 12: Cooperation ratios of cops and activists at different
time steps: (a) when the total deterrent force of the activists
is higher than that of the cops; (b) when the total deterrent
force of the activists is equal to that of the cops; (c) when the
total deterrent force of the activists is less than that of the
cops.
Different colors represent different types of agents’ emo-
tions. The stronger the color intensity, the larger the value
of the emotion. At first, the emotions of the cops and the
activists are very weak. Later, as a result of the confrontation
between cops and activists, both types of emotions increase.
Since the initial emotions of the cops are higher than those
of activists, the overall emotional scope of the cops becomes
wider and wider and that of the activists becomes smaller
and smaller. Finally, all the activists are wiped out by the
cops and there is no blue area on the map.
5.5 The influence of deterrent force on strategy selec-
tion
We present the relationship between deterrent force and
strategy selection in this subsection. We analyze the strat-
egy (cooperation or defection) adopted by each agent with
respect to their different deterrent forces.
Figure 12 shows the overview of cooperation ratios (the
ratio of the number of agents adopting a cooperation strat-
egy to the total number of this type of agents) in relation to
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different deterrent forces. When the total deterrent force of
the activists is higher than that of the cops (Figure 12a),
most of the cops adopt a cooperation strategy to avoid
causalities and conserve their fighting forces. When the total
deterrent force of the activists is equal to that of the cops,
the cooperation ratios of cops and activists are almost the
same from the 5th time step to the 45th time step. After the
45th time step, the cops defeat the activists. More and more
cops adopt defection strategy, the cooperation ratio of the
cops decreases, and the cooperation ratio of the activists
increases. When the total deterrent force of the activists
is less than that of the cops, the cooperation ratio of the
activists is higher than that of the cops.
In summary, the agent with a higher deterrent force is
more likely to adopt a defection strategy and the agent with
a lower deterrent force is more likely to adopt a cooperation
strategy.
5.6 Comparisons
To validate our approach, we compare our simulation re-
sults with those generated by the CVM [12] and ABEC [74]
models and real-world videos. Main goal of our model is
to predict trends of crowd movements in these situations
without explicitly modeling the trajectory of a particular
individual. Simulation results obtained by our model are
closest to the real-world scenes in the overall trends of
crowd movements.
The real scenes shown in Figures 13a and 13c are chosen
from the public web dataset [75]. The real scenes of Figures
13e, 13g, and 13i are chosen from real antagonistic incidents
on YouTube. For the real-world scenarios in Figure 13, we
use different colors to distinguish different roles of indi-
viduals. The green, purple, and blue circles and cylinders
represent civilians, activists, and cops, respectively. The red
arrows are the dominant paths of crowd movements. Cops
and activists in this case represent two opposing groups.
Civilians in this case represent onlookers and neutrals.
There are no deaths of activists or cops in these scenes.
The scenes can be simulated by increasing the values of
the thresholds of Twarn and Twarn time for our model. The
parameter values used in the simulation runs are listed in
Table 4. More details can be seen in the supplementary
video.
We use the dominant path and entropy metric to quan-
titively evaluate our simulation results. Dominant path
is defined based on collectiveness of crowd movements.
Collectiveness, which indicates the degree to which indi-
viduals acting as a unit, is a fundamental and universal
measurement for various crowd systems, including crowds
in antagonistic scenes [76]. Individuals locally coordinate
their movements and behaviors with their neighbors, and
then the crowd is self-organized into collective movements
without external control. The method proposed in [77] is
used to calculate the collectiveness of our simulation results.
When the collectiveness of individual movements in a cer-
tain area is significantly higher than that of surrounding
area, a small group of agents with similar movements is
formed. The center of the group is determined according to
the average of the positions of all the agents in this group.
The trajectory of the group center forms its dominant path
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
(i) (j)
Fig. 13: Comparisons between real scenes and our simula-
tion results. (a), (c), (e), (g), and (i) are five real antagonistic
scenes. (b), (d), (f), (h), and (j) are our corresponding simula-
tion results generated by our ACSEE model. The red arrows
are the dominant paths of crowd movements.
and can be treated as the movement trend of the whole
group. Using this method, we can get the dominant paths of
the real-world videos. We use entropy metric [78], angular
error (AE) [79], and inter-group distance metric (IDM) [80]
to evaluate our crowd simulation results. They are used
to evaluate the errors of trajectories, movement directions,
and distances between each group, respectively. These three
evaluation methods complement each other, which are used
to evaluate our results more comprehensively.
An entropy metric [78] is adopted to evaluate the error
between the dominant paths of simulation results and that
of the real-world videos. A lower entropy value implies a
higher similarity between the simulation results and the
real-world scenarios. Table 5 shows the entropy metric of
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the simulation results achieved by the CVM, ABEC, and
ACSEE (ours) models on different scenarios in Figure 13.
The simulation results obtained by our model conform to
the real-world videos best.
The angular error (AE) [79] between the movement
direction of the simulation result (Vx, Vy) and that of the
ground-truth (Vxgt, Vygt) is also used to evaluate our crowd
simulation method. This AE is defined in Equation 15.
The inter-group distance metric (IDM) [80] compares the
difference in the average distances between each pair of
clustered agents. Tables 6 and 7 show the AE and IDM of
our simulation results on different scenarios in Figure 13.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 show that our method consistently
outperforms the CVM and ABEC models. Compared with
the CVM model, our ACSEE model considers the agents’ an-
tagonistic emotions and accurately describe the differences
between agents’ deterrent forces. Compared with the ABEC
model only considering emotional contagion in antagonistic
scenarios, our method considers not only antagonistic emo-
tion, but also the relationship between antagonistic emotion
and evolutionary game theory. The agent is able to choose a
more reasonable strategy according to the situation.
AE = cos
−1
((Vx · Vxgt + Vy · Vygt)/
√
V 2x + V
2
y
√
V 2xgt + V
2
ygt) (15)
TABLE 5: Entropy metric for our simulation algorithms on
different scenarios from Figure 13. A lower entropy value
implies higher similarity between the simulation results and
the real-world scenarios. Simulations with an entropy score
less than 1.000 are considered very visually similar to the
source data and those with a score greater than 6.000 are
visually very different [78]. Scene No. 2 (Figure 13c) is too
large and chaotic and the collectiveness of crowd movement
is not so obvious. Therefore, the entropy value of Scene No.
2 is larger than 1.000, but this value is far less than 6.000.
Scene No. 1 2 3 4 5
ACSEE 0.193 1.310 0.255 0.104 0.117
ABEC 0.232 1.320 0.268 0.139 0.180
CVM 0.259 1.369 0.270 0.151 0.187
TABLE 6: AE for the simulation algorithms on different
scenes from Figure 13. A lower value for AE implies higher
similarity with respect to the real-world crowd videos. We
report mean and variance of AE at different time steps.
Scene No. 1 2 3 4 5
ACSEE 0.132/0.150 0.285/0.329 0.210/0.099 0.090/0.003 0.036/0.003
ABEC 0.214/0.155 0.463/3.027 0.999/12.822 0.500/0.002 0.558/0.006
CVM 1.329/20.709 1.579/1.500 1.464/14.452 0.948/0.007 0.856/0.062
The simulation result generated by our model is com-
pared with those of the CVM [12] and ABEC [74] models in
Figure 14. More details can be seen in the supplementary
video. In contrast to the CVM and ABEC models, our
method can better quantify the differences of the deterrent
forces of all the agents. Besides, we also integrate antag-
onistic emotional contagion into evolutionary game theory
TABLE 7: IDM (pixel) for our simulation algorithms on
different scenes from Figure 13. Lower numbers are better.
Scene No. 1 2 3 4 5
ACSEE 1 30 2 6 12
ABEC 31 32 21 18 35
CVM 40 42 32 49 63
to estimate situations of antagonistic scenes more accurately,
which helps agents make reasonable strategies in the games.
Therefore our simulation result is the most similar to the
real-world scenario.
5.7 User Studies
In this section we describe user studies conducted to demon-
strate the perceptual benefits of our ACSEE model com-
pared to other models in simulating antagonistic crowd
behaviors.
Experiment Goals & Expectations: Our main goal is to
measure how close the crowd movement tendencies gener-
ated using different models are to those observed in real-
world videos. We hypothesize that in both studies, agents
simulated with our ACSEE model will exhibit overall more
plausible antagonistic crowd movements than other models.
Therefore, participants will strongly prefer our model to the
other models.
Experimental Design: Two user studies were conducted
based on a paired-comparison design. In each study, partic-
ipants were shown pre-recorded videos in a side-by-side
comparison of simulation results generated by different
models and a real-world video. In particular, we asked
the users to compare the crowd movement tendencies gen-
erated by different crowd simulation models with those
observed in real-world videos. The studies had no time
constraints and the participants were free to take breaks
between the benchmarks. We encouraged the users to watch
these videos as many times as they wanted and finally give
a stable score.
Comparison Methods: The first study compares our
ACSEE model considering emotion with our model that
does not consider emotion. The second study compares our
model with the CVM [12] and ABEC [74] models.
Environments: We use outdoor scenarios without ob-
stacles. In these scenarios, the green, purple, blue, and
grey circles are civilians, activists, cops, and dead agents,
respectively.
Metrics: Participants were shown two pre-recorded
videos in a side-by-side comparison of the simulation result
and a real-world video. We asked the users to first watch
the real-world video and then rate each simulation result
on a scale of 1 - 5 in terms of the similarity of movement
tendencies between the real-world video and the simulation
result video. A score of 1 indicates most dissimilar and a
score of 5 indicates most similar movement tendencies.
Results: There are 39 participants (20 female) with a
mean age of 25.12±3.26 years in these studies. We measure
the mean and the variance of their scores and then compute
the p-values using a two-tailed t-test. The means of their
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(a) Real scenario (b) CVM result
(c) ABEC result (d) Our result
Fig. 14: Comparisons between the real scenario and sim-
ulation results of different crowd simulation models. The
simulation result obtained by our model conform to the real-
world video best.
Fig. 15: User evaluation of simulation scenes. (a) Compari-
son of simulation results considering emotion and without
considering emotion. (b) Comparison of simulation results
generated by the CVM, ABEC, and ACSEE models. Partic-
ipants were asked to rate each simulation result on a scale
of 1 - 5 in terms of the similarity of movement tendencies
between the real-world videos and the simulation result
videos. We can see from the results that our simulation
results are most similar to real-world scenarios.
scores for our model without emotion and with emotion
are 2.87 ± 0.67 and 3.73 ± 0.93, respectively. The means
of their scores for the CVM, ABEC, and ACSEE models
are 2.56 ± 1.44, 3.30 ± 0.50, and 3.70 ± 0.90, respectively.
The p-value for Figure 15a comparison is 2.97e−26. The p-
values for the comparison of the CVM and ACSEE models
and that of the ABEC and ACSEE models in Figure 15b
are 2.97e−26 and 1.05e−17, respectively. We observe that
the antagonistic crowd behavior simulations generated by
our ACSEE model score much higher than the other models
at a statistically significant rate (p-value<0.05). The result
indicates that the addition of antagonistic emotion and the
integration of antagonistic emotion and evolutionary game
theory improve the perceptual similarity of our simulations
to the crowd movement tendencies in real-world scenes.
Our model gets higher scores than the CVM and ABEC
models, as detailed in Figure 15b. Participants indicate their
preference for our ACSEE model.
6 CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
We present a new model for antagonistic crowd behavior
simulation integrated with emotional contagion and evolu-
tionary game theory. Our approach builds on well-known
psychological theories to present a comprehensive and an-
tagonistic emotional contagion model. Based on the emo-
tional calculation method, we propose the deterrent force to
determine the situation of cops and activists. According to
the situation, an enhanced evolutionary game theoretic ap-
proach incorporated with antagonistic emotional contagion
is determined. Finally, we present a behavior control deci-
sion method based on the antagonistic emotional contagion
and evolutionary game theoretic approaches.
Our proposed model is verified by simulations. We in-
vestigate the impact of different factors (number of agents,
emotion, strategy, etc.) on the outcome of crowd violence.
Our model is compared with real-world videos and previ-
ous approaches. Results show that our proposed model can
reliably generate realistic antagonistic crowd behaviors.
However, our model still has several limitations. Al-
though our simulation results are closer to the real-world
scenes in the overall trend of crowd movement, the antago-
nistic emotions in a crowd violent scene cannot be obtained
directly or inferred accurately. One of the main reasons is
that the quality of most of the real videos is poor, since
they are often captured by moving phones. At present,
there is no effective methods to identify and quantify the
emotion values of all the individual in such videos with
poor quality. Thus, the initial state of our model is set
empirically according to real-world videos, which is time-
consuming and not very accurate. In the future, we plan
to use the latest wearable equipment to collect these data
and provide a new method that can quickly and accurately
obtain the initial state. Moreover, the strategies and benefits
calculated by our antagonistic evolutionary game theoretic
approach are the ideal situations. Game theory assumes
that all individuals are rational. However, some people in
real scenes are irrational and extreme, which doesn’t fully
satisfy the precondition of game theory. In practice, people
do not necessarily adopt the optimal strategy because of
the limitations of perception and other complex factors.
Our current calculation result is optimal, which is only
one of the possible results. In fact, it is impossible for all
simulation results to be consistent with the real results. We
will continue to improve our prediction results considering
more actual situations of antagonistic crowds. At present,
the behavior control in our model is proposed based on
the cellular automata [15]. Other more complex behavioral
control methods will be further considered.
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